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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WHITNEY D. HAMMOND, Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Jim Eskridge, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ZELPH S. CALDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8827 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties herein will sometimes be designated in this 
brief as follows: Plaintiff and respondent, Whitney D. 
Hammond, Administrator of the Estate of Jim Eskridge, 
deceased, as the "respondent," original plaintiff Jim Esk-
ridge as "plaintiff," and Zelph S. Calder, defendant and 
appellant, as "appellant." Emphasis has been supplied. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
We deem it essential to a proper disposition of this cas 
that all of the facts be fully presented. Because we believ 
that the brief of the appellant does not do so we will under 
take to set forth concisely the essential facts. Reference 
to the record will be designated as "R," and references t~ 
the transcript of proceedings as "T.P." 
Appellant owns property located on Diamond Moun 
tain in Uintah County approximately thirty-five miles north 
east of Vernal, Utah. On September 26, 1950, appellan 
entered into a written lease with plaintiff, a resident of th 
State of Colorado, under the terms of which plaintiff ob 
tained the right to farm part of appellant's land and agreec 
to pay appellant one-fourth of the crops produced thereon 
The lease had a primary term of eight years beginnin~ 
November 1, 1950 (R. 2). At the time the lease was exe 
cuted none of the leased land had been cleared and it wa: 
necessary for plaintiff to clear the land before crops coul< 
be planted. Plaintiff subsequently cleared approximate!~ 
658 acres (T.P. 19). 
The lease provided that appellant was to have grazin~ 
rights on the lands, but that plaintiff was to have the ex· 
elusive right to say when appellant could graze his livestocl 
on the growing grain. Appellant was to maintain fence: 
around the premises in a condition that would prevent range 
stock from damaging the crops (R. 2). On numerous occa 
sions appellant permitted his livestock to go upon the Ian< 
farmed by plaintiff without permission, causing consider 
able damage to the crops growing thereon. On October 13 
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1955, plaintiff filed a complaint against appellant in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah in and 
for Uintah County, praying for a temporary restraining 
order restraining appellant from further trespassing, graz-
ing or damaging the crops and for damages in the amount 
of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) (R. 
1). 
On October 18, 1955, appellant served a notice demand-
ing that plaintiff file a nonresident cost bond (R. 7). Plain-
tiff was killed in an airplane accident on October 29, 1955 
(R. 84). A motion for an extension of time for filing the 
cost bond in order that an administrator of plaintiff's 
estate could be appointed was filed and granted on Novem-
ber 15, 1955 (R. 9 and 10). Appellant filed a motion to 
dismiss with prejudice for failure to file a nonresident cost 
bond on December 17, 1955 (R. 11). 
On January 9, 1956, plaintiff's widow who had been 
appointed administratrix of his estate in the State of Colo-
rado filed a motion asking the court to deny appellant's 
motion to dismiss on the ground that she had filed a peti-
tion asking for the appointment of Whitney D. Hammond, 
a Utah resident, as Administrator of the Estate of Jim 
Eskridge in the State of Utah, and a motion praying for his 
substitution as party plaintiff in place of her deceased hus-
band in the proceedings against appellant. She further 
alleged that an ancillary administrator of the estate of a 
nonresident deceased plaintiff who has been substituted as 
a party plaintiff should not be required to file a nonresi-
dent cost bond (R. 12). Appellant's motion to dismiss was 
denied on January 12, 1956 (R. 13). Letters of Adminis-
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tration were issued to Whitney D. Hammond on Februar; 
7, 1956, (R. 86) and an order substituting Whitney D 
Hammond, administrator, as party plaintiff was enterec 
the same day (R. 16). Appellant filed an answer and coun 
terclaim February 29, 1956 (R. 19). Plaintiff's reply wa: 
filed April 3, 1956. The case was set for trial June 25 
1956. On the date set for trial appellant and responden 
through their respective counsel entered into a stipulatim 
of settlement in the presence of the trial Judge, Honorable 
Maurice Harding (R. 35). 
The stipulation provided in part that the responden1 
would be permitted to harvest the grain growing on thE 
south and middle units of the Calder property and sell thE 
estate's share of the wheat under appellant's wheat allot. 
ment and appellant would be given immediate possessior 
of the north unit (R. 35). Subsequently, a dispute arose a~ 
to whether the respondent had the right to sell the estate'~ 
share of the wheat under appellant's wheat allotment freE 
from the penalty incurred when appellant harvested thE 
volunteer wheat on the north unit, thereby causing the total 
acreage harvested on the Calder property to exceed the 
acreage allotment set by the Uintah County Stabilizatio11 
Committee and subjecting all of the wheat to a penalty. 
Judge Harding ruled that under the terms of the stipulation, 
the respondent had the right to sell the estate's share o1 
the wheat free from penalty and so ordered (R. 12). 
The stipulation also provided that appellant would pa~ 
respondent two-sevenths of the cost of clearing the land. 
The cost of clearing was to be determined by two people~ 
one selected by the appellant and one by the respondent. 
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The persons so selected found that the cost of clearing was 
Twelve Dollars ($12.00) per acre (R. 36). This figure 
included the cost of the first plowing by which plaintiff 
broke the ground for the first time and cut or broke the 
brush loose so it could be raked into piles for burning ( T .P. 
10 and 11). Appellant refused to accept this figure claim-
ing that the cost of the first plowing should not have been 
included as a part of the cost of clearing the land. After 
hearing evidence, the trial court ruled that the parties in-
tended that the cost of the first plowing should be included 
in the cost of clearing at the time they entered into the 
stipulation and that the cost of clearing the land was 
Twelve Dollars ($12.00) per acre (T.P. 37 and 38) and 
ordered appellant to pay two-sevenths of the cost of clear-
ing plus costs (R. 71). 
Appellant filed a pleading designated "Defendant's 
Request for Claim against Plaintiff" on January 21, 1958, 
praying for judgment against the respondent in the amount 
of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) for 
damages arising from the removal of a steel granary which 
plaintiff had placed on the Calder premises to be used in 
storing grain thereon (R. 77). Appellant presented no evi-
dence regarding this claim and the court below denied ap-
pellant's "Request" (R. 78). 
Appellant now appeals from the following: 
1. Court's order denying appellant's motion to dismiss 
with prejudice for failure of ancillary administrator to file 
nonresident cost bond. 
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2. Court's order requiring appellant to permit respon 
dent to sell estate's share of wheat under appellant's whea 
allotment without penalty in accordance with the terms o: 
the Stipulation of Settlement. 
3. Court's finding that the cost of clearing was Twelv4 
Dollars ($12.00) per acre. 
4. Court's award of costs to respondent. 
5. Court's denial of appellant's "Request for Clain 
Against Plaintiff." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPE~ 
LANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJU-
DICE FOR FAILURE TO FILE NONRESIDENT 
COST BOND. 
POINT II. 
COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE 
TERMS OF STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT. 
POINT III. 
COURT PROPERLY ENTERED ORDER PER-
MITTING RESPONDENT TO SELL WHEAT 
WITHOUT PENALTY. 
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POINT IV. 
COURT'S FINDING AS TO COST OF CLEAR-
ING LAND WAS PROPER. 
POINT V. 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR RE-
MOVAL OF GRANARY. 
POINT VI. 
COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS TO 
RESPONDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPE~ 
LANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJU-
DICE FOR FAILURE TO FILE NONRESIDENT 
COST BOND. 
Appellant contends that the court erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to file a 
nonresident cost bond. In this regard it should be noted 
that plaintiff filed the complaint in the instant case on 
October 13, 1955. Plaintiff died on October 29, 1955. 
Whitney D. Hammond, a Utah resident, was subsequently 
appointed ancillary administrator of plaintiff's estate in 
Utah and substituted as party plaintiff. 
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Rule 12 (j), Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code All 
notated, 1953, provides that plaintiffs who reside outsid 
the state or are foreign corporations must file cost bond 
upon demand. Rule 12 (j) provides that a nonresiden 
plaintiff shall have thirty days after service of notice re 
questing security for costs to file a cost bond. This perioc 
had not elapsed at the time of plaintiff's death. Therefore 
at that time the court below had no power to dismiss fo: 
failure to file the cost bond. 
If the original plaintiff was not obligated to file a cos 
bond prior to his death, the only question which remain: 
is whether a Utah resident who is subsequently appointe< 
and qualified as ancillary administrator of plaintiff's es 
tate in the State of Utah and substituted as party plaintif: 
should be required to file a cost bond. There are no Utal 
statutes that so provide. 
The courts have long held that the right to requirt 
security for costs is a creature of statute, and unless thE 
obligation of furnishing security has been imposed by legis· 
lative enactment, a party may not be required to file a cosi 
bond or guarantee the payment of costs. Honduras v. Soto 
172 N.Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845; Ann: 24 Eng. Rul. Cas. 31 
As indicated in Outlaw v. Pearce, 11 S. E. 2d 600, 603, 17( 
Va. 458, the purpose of such statutes is to insure to tht 
defendant and to the officials of the court the payment o: 
costs which may be awarded against a nonresident plaintif: 
against whom the court has no means of enforcing a collec 
tion, and to insure that the court will have some financiall~ 
responsible person within reach of process. State ex rel 
Tangon v. District Court, 111 Mont. 178, 107 P. 2d 880, 881 
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It would, therefore, appear clear that there is no need 
for an ancillary administrator who is an officer of the 
court to post a cost bond to insure payment of costs. This 
is especially true in the instant case where the adminis-
trator has filed a corporate surety bond in the amount of 
Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) (R. 851/2) and there 
are considerable assets in the Utah estate (R. 87). 
The Utah Supreme Court has on several occasions held 
that the provisions requiring cost bonds should be construed 
so as to permit litigants to have every reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard on the merits of the case. In discussing 
this problem the court in Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett D. 
Ford Contractm·s, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P. 2d 191, said that: 
"The objection raised by defendant that secur-
ity for costs was not filed within one month after 
notice is at best but a technical one. The only legiti-
mate advantage defendant was entitled to was pro-
tection from loss of costs. * * *" 
and that 
"* * * The general philosophy of the new 
Rules of Civil Procedure is that liberality should be 
indulged 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.' In construing and 
applying these rules it should be the purpose of the 
courts to afford litigants every reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard on the merits of their cases. This 
policy is not an innovation to our law. It has long 
been embodied both in the statutes and decisions 
that deviation from form and procedure shall not 
work a forfeiture of substantive rights in the ab-
sence of prejudice to the opposing party." 
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There would appear to be absolutely no basis upot 
which the Utah statute could be construed so as to requir4 
an ancillary administrator to file a cost bond. Therefore 
the court below had no alternative but to deny appellant'~ 
motion to dismiss. 
POINT II. 
COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE 
TERMS OF STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT. 
On the date set for trial, appellant and responden1 
through their respective counsel after considerable discus-
sion of all aspects of the case entered into a stipulation o1 
settlement in the presence of the court. Appellant there-
after failed to perform in accordance with the terms o1 
the stipulation and under Point II of his brief questiom 
the authority of the court below to enforce the terms of 
the stipulation. 
In view of the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, 
there can be no question as to the law regarding this ques-
tion in Utah. The court was confronted with almost ex-
actly the same question in Johnson v. Peoples Finance and 
Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P. 2d 171, where the cour1 
stated that: 
"* * * However, when the parties failed tc 
perform in accordance with their stipulations, thE 
court was not powerless to require them to abide b' 
their agreement. It would indeed be a serious re-
flection upon our system of jurisprudence if partie~ 
could stipulate an agreement of settlement but re-
fuse with impunity from performing. Courts are no1 
impotent when one or more parties to a stipulatior 
becomes recalcitrant. * * *" 
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This is in accord with the rule generally accepted elsewhere. 
It is, therefore, clear that the court below had authority 
to enforce the terms of the stipulation of settlement. 
POINT III. 
COURT PROPERLY ENTERED ORDER PER-
MITTING RESPONDENT TO SELL WHEAT 
WITHOUT PENALTY. 
Appellant contends that the court erred in permitting 
the respondent to sell the estate's share of the wheat har-
vested on the Calder property in the fall of 1956 under 
appellant's wheat allotment without penalty. In this re-
gard it should be noted that in order to participate in the 
U. S. Department of Agriculture Commodity Stabilization 
Program the plaintiff could harvest grain from only part 
of land which he was farming. Therefore, during the fall 
of 1955 plaintiff planted grain in only the south and middle 
units of the Calder property but planted nothing in the 
north unit. Some volunteer grain was growing on the north 
unit at the time appellant and respondent entered into the 
stipulation of settlement. The stipulation provided in part 
that the respondent would harvest the grain then growing 
on the south and middle units and give appellant one-fourth 
of grain harvested (R. 35). The respondent knew that if 
the volunteer grain growing on the north unit was har-
vested the acreage allotment established by the County 
Stabilization Committee could not be complied with, and 
the grain harvested on the south and middle units could 
not be sold under appellant's wheat allotment without a 
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penalty. Prior to entering into the stipulation this prob-
lem was discussed at great length in the presence of the 
court with appellant and his counsel. The respondent did 
not care what happened to the volunteer wheat on the north 
:unit so long as it was not used in a manner that would 
prevent respondent from selling the estate's share of the 
wheat under appellant's wheat allotment. It was under 
these circumstances that the respondent agreed to give 
appellant immediate possession of the north unit and the 
appellant agreed that "the plaintiff (respondent) shall 
have the right to sell his share of the wheat under appel-
lant's wheat allotment" (R. 35) . In spite of that under-
standing, appellant proceeded to harvest the volunteer wheat 
growing on the north unit. As a result, the Agricultural 
Stabilization Committee for Uintah County ruled that none 
of the wheat harvested on the Calder property could be 
sold under defendant's wheat allotment without penalty. 
Appellant refused to permit the respondent to sell the es-
tate's share of the wheat without penalty. On October 23, 
1956, Judge Harding ruled that under the terms of the 
stipulation the respondent was entitled to sell his share of 
the wheat under appellant's wheat allotment without pen-
alty and ordered the appellant to refrain from taking any 
action which would prevent the respondent from obtaining 
the necessary authority to do so. 
Appellant now contends that the trial judge was in 
error in so ruling. Judge Harding was present throughout 
the discussion which led up to the stipulation of settlement 
and was present at the time it was entered into. It is fun-
damental that stipulations must be construed in light of 
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the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time they 
entered into the stipulation and in view of the result which 
they were attempting to accomplish. People v. Nolan, 33 
Cal. App. 493, 496, 165 P. 2d 715, 716; Hengel v. Hengel, 
329 Mo. 571, 46 S. W. 2d 157. Judge Harding who was fully 
apprised of the circumstances surrounding the making of 
the stipulation ruled that the parties intended that the re-
spondent would be able to sell the estate's share of the 
wheat under appellant's wheat allotment free of penalty 
and ordered appellant to take whatever action necessary 
to obtain that result. To adopt appellant's contention would 
render the last phrase of the stipulation meaningless. 
As indicated in the discussion under Point II above, it 
was within the power of the trial court to construe the 
provisions of the stipulation and enforce the terms thereof. 
POINT IV. 
COURT'S FINDING AS TO COST OF CLEAR-
ING LAND WAS PROPER. 
Appellant in Point III of his brief contends that the 
court's finding as to the cost of clearing the land was not 
substantiated by the evidence. In this regard it should be 
noted that the primary term of the Eskridge lease was 
eight years beginning November 1, 1950 (R. 2). At the 
time the lease was executed, none of the property had been 
cleared. Plaintiff subsequently cleared 658 acres of the 
Calder property. When the parties entered into the stipu-
lation of agreement, appellant agreed to pay the respon-
dent two-sevenths of the cost of clearing the premises and 
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respondent agreed that the lease would be terminated after 
the grain had been harvested in the fall of 1956 (R. 35). 
In clearing the land plaintiff had experimented with 
several methods of clearing. The one he found most satis-
factory and which he used to clear the most of the land 
consisted of first plowing the land with a specially designed 
machine to cut the brush and break the soil, then either 
raking or harrowing to gather the brush into piles for 
burning and finally burning the brush. After the brush 
had been burned, it was necessary to plow the land again 
and in some cases go over it with a leveler in order to pre-
pare the seed bed (T.P. 10 and 11). 
Appellant and respondent agreed that two persons 
would be selected to determine the cost of clearing the land. 
Appellant selected Wayne Goodrich and the respondent 
selected Raymond Searle (R. 35). Searle and Goodrich 
agreed that the cost of clearing the land was Twelve Dol-
lars ($12.00) per acre and filed a report to that effect (R. 
36) . This figure included the cost of the plaintiff's initial 
plowing which he used to cut the brush and loosen the soil. 
Appellant refused to accept this figure claiming that the 
term "clearing" as used in the stipulation was not intended 
to include the cost of the first plowing. 
On November 26, 1957, the trial judge heard evidence 
pertaining to the cost of clearing. At the hearing Raymond 
Searle testified that he had cleared land in the vicinity of 
the Calder property for eighteen or twenty years (T.P. 4). 
That in his opinion such land could not be cleared properly 
without first plowing it because otherwise you could not 
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obtain a good kill on the brush (R. 10). That the first 
plowing was much more difficult and expensive than sub-
sequent plowings because the soil in the area of the Calder 
property is very hard and it is necessary to cut or break 
the brush loose, so that it can be raked and burned (R. 12). 
He further explained that after the brush is broken or cut 
loose it is necessary to rake or harrow it into piles for 
burning and then the brush must be burned (T.P. 10 and 
11). After the burning, the land must be plowed again and 
in many cases leveled before seeds can be planted (T.P. 11). 
He testified that he was familiar with the Calder land and 
plaintiff's methods of clearing it and that in his opinion 
it cost plaintiff a minimum of Twelve Dollars ( $12.00) per 
acre to clear the land and that it probably cost him sub-
stantially more (T.P. 7 and 15). This figure included only 
the costs of the first plowing, raking and burning opera-
tions and did not include the cost of subsequent operations 
necessary to prepare the soil for planting. 
Mr. Wayne Goodrich did not appear at this hearing 
and defendant's only witnesses were himself and his brother, 
Leo Calder. 
The court after hearing the evidence ruled that 
"* * * the clearing included the plowing, that that was 
included within the contemplation of the parties at the 
time the stipulation was made * * *" (T.P. 37), and 
that the cost of clearing the ground was Twelve Dollars 
($12.00) per acre (T.P. 38). 
It is submitted that in addition to the evidence outlined 
herein the transcript of proceedings of the hearing held 
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for the purpose of determining the cost of clearing discloses 
substantial evidence in support of Judge Harding's finding 
as to the cost of clearing. The arguments with reference 
to the trial court's authority to construe the stipulation 
and enforce the terms thereof presented under Points II 
and III above are also applicable here. 
POINT V. 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR RE-
MOVAL OF GRANARY. 
On January 21, 1958, appellant filed a pleading desig-
nated "Defendant's Request for Claim Against Plaintiff" 
praying for judgment against plaintiff in the amount of 
Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) plus costs 
for damages arising from the removal of a granary which 
plaintiff had placed on the Calder property. It is difficult 
to determine just what this pleading is but it appears to 
be more closely related to a counterclaim than anything 
else. There are no provisions in the Utah statutes which 
would permit the filing of a pleading such as this. 
Appellant presented no evidence with relation to his 
"Request." The minute entry dated January 21, 1958, states 
that "the motion for hearing claims in this matter was 
denied" (R. 78). It is not clear whether this entry refers 
to appellant's "Request." If it does, there is nothing to 
indicate whether the court considered the "Request" on its 
merits or denied the motion upon other grounds. In view 
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of the present state of the record, we submit that there 
is nothing properly before the court. 
In this regard it should also be noted that the burden 
is upon the appellant to affirmatively show error. The 
Utah Supreme Court has adopted the rule that judgments 
of courts are presumed to be correct, if nothing in the rec-
ord appears to the contrary. Burton v. Zions Co-op Mer-
cantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514; Johnson v. 
Peoples Finance and Thrift Co., supra. 
POINT VI. 
COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS TO 
RESPONDENT. 
Rule 54 (d) (1), Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provides that "* * * costs shall be al-
lowed * * * to the prevailing party. * * *" In 
the instant case judgment was rendered in favor of the 
respondent and he was a warded costs as the prevailing 
party (R. 72). 
Appellant's failure to comply with the term of the 
stipulation resulted in additional hearings and expenses 
and finally a judgment against appellant. 
Appellant now contends on page 19 of his brief that 
since the court rendered a judgment against him, the equit-
able thing to do would be to assess costs against the re-
spondent. We submit that such a contention has no merit 
whatsoever. 
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CONCLUSION 
We submit that the trial court's actions with regard 
to this matter were proper in all respects. The original 
plaintiff was not obligated to file a cost bond prior to his 
death and the ancillary administrator who was substituted 
as party plaintiff is not required to file a cost bond. There-
fore, the trial court had no alternative other than to deny 
appellant's motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to 
file a cost bond. The trial court was familiar with the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of the stipulation of 
settlement and the results the parties intended to achieve 
thereby. The construction given to the disputed provisions 
in the stipulation was in accord with the language used in 
the stipulation, and the court was authorized to enforce 
the terms thereof. The court's finding as to the cost of 
clearing is fully supported by the evidence. There is noth-
ing properly before this court regarding appellant's claim 
for damages arising from the removal of a granary. Rule 
54 (d) ( 1) , Rules of Ci vii Procedure, expressly provides 
that costs may be awarded to the prevailing party. 
For the reasons set forth herein we respectfully submit 
that the judgment and the various orders of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COLTON & HAMMOND, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
STERLING D. COLTON, 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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